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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a breach of contract action seeking payment of adjusted rents for the 201 0 Rent 
Adjustment Period 1 now due and owing under the terms and conditions of Section 1.3(b) of the 
parties' Ground Lease Agreement because the amount of such disputed and outstanding rents has 
been determined by the Honorable Mitchell \V. Brown in his November 26, 2012 Declaratory 
Judgment. (R Vol. I, pp. 15-17). 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC 
("PMC'), filed its Complaint against the Defendants/ Appellants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, 
LLC ("Quail Ridge") and its principal owner and personal guarantor, Forrest Preston ("Preston") on 
1 In Bannock County Case No CV-2010-0002724-0C [(currently under advisement with this 
Court as Supreme Court Docket No. 40566-2012], the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown found, among other 
things, that Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, LLC, and Quail Ridge Medical 
Investors, LLC, are successors in interest to a Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 1983. (R Vol. 
1, p. 46, at~ 7). Judge Brown also found that this Ground Lease Agreement called for rent to be adjusted 
every three years, with one of those three year adjustment periods to commence on February 1, 2010. (R 
Vol. 1, pp. 51-52, at ~8). Judge Brown ultimately declared in that action the amount of rent that should 
have been paid during this rent adjustment period that should have commenced on February 1, 2010 (R 
Vol. 1, p. 58, at~ 45), which period is referred to in this brief for convenience as the "2010 Rent 
Adjustment Period." This prior action has been referred to by Appellants as PMC I and, therefore, for 
convenience will be identified as the same in the Respondent Brief. 
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December 12, 2012. (R Vol. I, pp. 9-17). Quail Ridge and Preston (collectively referred to 
hereinafter as "Quail-Preston") filed a Joint Answer and Jury Demand on 29, 3. (R Vol. 
I, pp. 20-24). 
On or about February 7, 2012, Quail-Preston filed their Motion to Stay, requesting that the 
district court stay this proceeding while PJ:fC I proceeded on appeal. (R Vol. I, pp. 25-33). PMC 
timely resisted Quail-Preston's Motion to Stay (R Vol. I, pp. 34-72) and the district court ultimately 
held a hearing on this issue on March 4, 2013. (Tr Hr'g on March 4, 2013 2, pp. 8-22). At the 
conclusion of this March 4, 2013 hearing, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz entered an order on the 
record staying the proceeding and requiring Quail-Preston to post a bond in the amount set out in 
Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment entered in Plv!C I during the pendency of the stay 
pursuant to the court's authority under I.R.C.P. 60(b). (R Vol.l, p. 4, 87-893) (Tr Hr"g on March 4, 
2 Respondent recognizes that l.A.P. 35(3) provides that ·'references to the reporter's transcript 
shall be made by the designation 'Tr' followed by the volume .... " In this case, however, a review of the 
reporter's transcripts shows that the reporter has identified all volumes as "Volume One of One'' with the 
page numbers restarting in each new volume. As such, for clarity within the Respondent Brief, the 
reporter's transcripts are being referred to by the hearing date in substitution for the volume that 
otherwise would have been referenced. 
3 Although the district court prepared a Minute Entry and Order, file stamped March 7, 2013, 
which detailed the results of the March 4, 2013 hearing, a review of the Clerk Record on Appeal does not 
show that this document was lodged with the Clerk of Court. This document, was, however, served on 
the counsel for the parties to this action. As such, it was attached as an Exhibit in PMC's Motion to 
Compel and, therefore, can be found in the Clerk's record on Appeal, at pp. 87-89. 
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2013, pp. 20:17- 22:8). lUl\JU.".H Quail-Preston's counsel argued during the hearing that a bond 
was unnecessary, Quail-Preston's counsel also conceded during the same hearing that the district 
court had authority under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to require a bond under the circumstances of this case and 
that such requirement was certainly reasonable and within the court's discretion. (Tr Hr' g on March 
4, 2013, pp. 12:24-13:20, 18:11-22). 
Despite the concessions made by Quail-Preston's attorney during the hearing acknowledging 
that the district court was within its authority and rights to require the posting of a bond during the 
pendency of a stay and that such a requirement would be reasonable and further despite the fact that 
Judge Naftz entered an order requiring Quail-Preston to post a bond in this action during the 
pendency of the stay, Quail-Preston ultimately failed or refused to post a bond in this matter. On 
June 13, 2013, PM C filed a Motion to Com pel and supporting documents, requesting that the district 
court either enter a new order requiring Quail-Preston to immediately post a bond or, in the 
alternative, for the district court to lift the previous stay and allow this matter to proceed. (R Vol. 
1, p. 79-96). A hearing on PMC's Motion to Compel was held on July 8, 2013. (Tr Hr'g on July 
8, 2013, pp. 8:1- 14:2). At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Naftz granted PMC's motion to 
compel and ordered that Quail-Preston post the bond previously ordered by 5:00p.m. on July 22, 
2013, or the stay in this matter would be automatically lifted. (Tr Hr'g on July 8, 2013, pp. 12:24-
13:15). Judge Naftz also awarded on the record PMC's attorney fees for having to bring the motion 
to compel. On July 11, 2013, Judge Naftz entered a Minute Entry and Order consistent with his 
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ruling from the bench. (R 1, pp. 100-101 ). Once again, despite having been given additional 
time to do so, Quail-Preston failed or refused to post bond ordered by Judge As a result, 
the stay in this matter was automatically lifted after 5:00p.m. on July 22, 2013, after Quail-Preston 
failed to timely post the court ordered bond. 
On September 5, 2013, PMC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
documents. (R Vol. 1, pp. 102-200). Quail-Preston filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
on September 23, 2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 331). The district court heard oral arguments on the parties' 
cross motions for summary judgment on October 21,2013. (Tr Hr'g on October 21,2013, pp. 8:1-
47:21). At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Naftz granted on the record PMC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied on the record Quail-Preston's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Tr Hr'g on October 21, 2013, pp. 44:21 - 47:6). On October 22, 2013, Judge Naftz signed a 
Judgment consistent with his earlier ruling on the record and entered the Judgment on October 23, 
2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 338-39). 
On November6, 2013, Quail-Preston timely appealed the0ctober23, 2013 Judgment, which 
appeal was filed with the district court on November 7, 2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 394-397). Also on 
November 6, 2013, PMC timely filed its Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees accompanied by a 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees. (R Vol. 1, pp. 340-393). Quail-Preston opposed 
PMC's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees (R Vol. 1, pp. 403-410). The district court heard oral 
arguments on this issue on December 16,2013 and took the matter under advisement. (Tr Hr'g on 
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December 16, 3, pp. 8:1 - 17: 17). On January 7, 2014, Judge Naftz entered an Order Regarding 
Attorney Fees, wherein he granted PMC, as the prevailing party to the action, costs and attorneys 
fees in the total sum of$16,830.93. (R Vol. 1, pp. 413-419). On that same date, the district court 
entered a Final Judgment in favor ofPMC in the amount of$416,812.60, plus interest of$45,221.30 
for a total of$462,033.80, plus an award of attorneys fees and costs in the amount of$16,830.93. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 420-21). This Final Judgment was recorded by the clerk of court on January 8, 2014. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 420-21). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This is a breach of contract action seeking payment of adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent 
Adjustment Period. (R VoL 1, pp. 9-17). It is undisputed in this case that the parties to this action 
are governed by and subject to the terms and conditions of a Ground Lease Agreement dated January 
1983 ("Lease Agreement"). (R Vol. I, pp. 46). 
This case, however, is not the first action between these parties with respect to the Lease 
Agreement. In Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C- the action which Quail-Preston 
identifies in their Appellant's Brief as p;ttC I PMC ultimately brought claims against Quail Ridge 
for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. (R VoL I, pp. 255-263). A general review of 
PMC's pleadings in that prior action demonstrates that PMC's breach of contract claim was based 
upon the fact that Quail Ridge refused to pay adjusted rents to PMC after PMC had given it an 
appraisal and made a demand for increased rent payment. (R Vol. I, pp. 255-263). Nowhere in that 
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prior action PMC ever allege that the disputed rents had ever been properly declared by an 
arbitrator or by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
It became clear. however, through the pretrial motion stage of P!v!C I that Judge Brown was 
reading the Lease Agreement so as to require the rent adjustment to take place before the additional 
rent amount would actually be due. In other words, Judge Brown interpreted the Lease Agreement 
such that Quail Ridge was not obligated to pay adjusted rents until after such had been properly 
declared by an arbitrator or by a court of competent jurisdiction. It also became clear that Judge 
Brown was interpreting the Lease Agreement such that Quail Ridge was not obligated under the 
terms of that agreement to voluntarily participate in the rent adjustment process as had been alleged 
and complained ofby PMC. (R VoL I, p. 273-2774). Thus, when Quail Ridge moved for directed 
verdict on PMC's breach of contract claim at the conclusion ofPMC's evidence in PA1C /,counsel 
for PMC did not resist Quail Ridge's motion because it was apparent that the breach of contract 
claim was not yet ripe-the condition precedent, the adjustment of the rent amount, had not yet taken 
place. (R Vol. I, p. 274-276). Note that evidence was presented at trial that Quail Ridge did not 
voluntarily participate in the rent adjustment process after it had been presented with a valid 
4 Judge Brown clearly outlines the development of this contract interpretation within the 
Discussion section of his Order on Form of Judgment. A review of this section of Judge Brown's Order 
on Form of Judgment demonstrates that Judge Brown was of the opinion that a breach of contract claim 
against Quail Ridge was not yet ripe because Quail Ridge was not obligated to pay adjusted rents until 
such had been properly declared, in this case by the court, nor was Quail Ridge obligated under the Lease 
Agreement to voluntarily participate in the rent adjustment process. 
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appraisal of the leased ground; however, PMC's counsel understood that the result of the trial would 
be that Judge Brown would make determination of the amount rent that was due, past and 
present, and that upon making that determination the amounts would be immediately due to be paid 
by Quail. Judge Brown has made it clear that, by his literal reading of the lease agreement, the 
increased amount of lease payment only became due after the determination, as stated in his Order 
on Form of Judgment: 
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that •·the party indebted shall, 
promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected 
by the adjustment." Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the 
determination has been made as contemplated under the Ground Lease 
Agreement, the Ground Lease Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the 
balance due under the Ground Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease 
Agreement does not define the term prompt tor purposes of the parties' 
agreement, a failure to pay this amount in a reasonable time certainly would 
give rise to an action for breach of contract. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 275) (emphasis added). It is undisputed in this case that Quail-Preston has not paid 
the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment period even though such had been determined by 
Judge Brown in his Amended Declaratory Judgment as currently due and owing to PMC. Based 
upon this failure to pay, PMC filed this current breach of contract action against both Quail Ridge 
and Preston. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL: ATTORL~EY FEES ON APPEAL 
PMC asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees and costs in the event it prevails on this appeal. 
PMC would continue to be the overall prevailing party in this litigation if the district court is upheld 
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on appeaL is set more fully the Respondent's Arguments infra, PMC is entitled to 
cnr,n.rr•<"H fees and costs this action pursuant to Sections 1 120(3) of the Idaho Code; pursuant to 




Quail-Preston's primary argument in this case is that PMC 's current breach of contract claim 
should be barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because PMC brought 
a breach of contract action against Quail Ridge in the prior action, herein identified as PlvlC I. Quail-
Preston's arguments, however, miss the mark because they focus upon the wrong set of facts. 
The set of facts and legal basis giving rise to the current breach of contract claim against the 
Defendants-Appellants, Quail-Preston, is best summarized and detailed by the judge presiding over 
Plvfl I, the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown. In his Order on Form of Judgment, Judge Brown stated 
the following concerning the impact his Declaratory Judgment would have upon the parties and the 
possibility of a future breach of contract claim relating to the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period for which 
he had declared adjusted rents: 
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party indebted shall, 
promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected 
by the adjustment." Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the 
determination has been made as contemplated under the Ground Lease 
Agreement, the Ground Lease Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the 
balance due under the Ground Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease 
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Agreement does not define the term prompt for purposes of the parties' 
agreement, a failure to pav this amount in a reasonable time certainly would 
give rise to an action for breach of contract. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 275) (emphasis added). So the natural question becomes, why would Judge Brown 
grant a directed verdict against PMC on the first breach of contract claim and then state in his final 
order that Quail Ridge will have an action for breach of contract if Quail Ridge fails to pay to PM C 
in a reasonable time the adjusted 2010 rents he declared due and owing? The answer to that question 
is simple: Judge Brown understood that the breach of contract claim was not ripe until after his 
declaratory judgment established the amount that was due. In his order Judge Brown made it clear 
that PMC would have the right to pursue the breach of contract claim should Quail Ridge fail in its 
obligations to pay within a reasonable amount of time such rents declared by him as due and owing 
for the 2010 Rent Adjusted Period. 
Quail-Preston in their arguments before the district court below and now before this Court 
completely ignore the above language from Judge Brown. The simple fact is that Quail did not meet 
the obligations for rent payment that had been determined by the court and, as a result, the current 
breach of contract claim was brought against them. Judge Naftz was, however, provided a copy of 
Judge Brown's Order on Form of Judgment and it is clear from his decisions that Judge Naftz 
recognized the above-outlined facts and understood that Judge Brown's order gave rise to a new 
breach of contract action. Judge N aftz further correctly understood that there were no genuine issues 
of material fact on this issue. 
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As will be discussed more thoroughly below, Judge Naftz' rejection of Quail-Preston·s 
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel was warranted and consistent with the law because: 
(1) ripeness has long been recognized in Idaho and within the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
as an exception to the these legal doctrines; (2) Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment in PMC I and 
Quail-Preston's failure to promptly pay the 2 01 0 adjusted rents in a reasonab 1 e time thereafter created 
a change of circumstances which has also been recognized by Idaho and the Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments as an exception to these legal doctrines; or (3) Judge Brown reserved to PMC in his 
Order on Form of Judgment the right to pursue a breach of contract action against Quail Ridge 
should it fail to promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents declared by him as now due and owing. 
Section 26( 1 )(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments recognizes that when the first court in 
an action between the parties reserves the right to a plaintiff to pursue a second action, res judicata 
and collateral estoppel do not act as a bar to the second action by the plaintiff. 
Any of the above-identified legal exceptions gave Judge Naftz the right to find that PMC s 
breach of contract claim against Quail-Preston was not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. In this case, all three exceptions are satisfied. Because there were no genuine 
issues of material fact with regard to PMC's breach of contract claim, Judge Naftz appropriately 
granted summary judgment in this case. Furthermore, because Judge Naftz appropriately granted 
summary judgment in favor ofPMC, it is the prevailing party below and is entitled to the costs and 
attorneys fees awarded by Judge Naftz. 
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B. Standard of review 
Quail-Preston accurately standard of review within the Appellant Brief. Simply 
put, if there were no genuine issues of any material fact after the district court weighed all evidence 
in favor of the non-moving parties on the cross-motions for summary judgment, then the district 
court's findings of fact must not be disturbed on appeal. Similarly, if the district court correctly 
stated the law, the district court's conclusions oflaw should also stand on appeal. 
C. Ripeness has long been recognized in Idaho and within the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments as an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and 
Collateral Estoppel. 
Idaho courts have long recognized ripeness as a limitation on the doctrine of res judicata. 
See Gaige v. CityofBoise, 91 Idaho 481,485,425 P.2d 52,56 (1967) (finding that even though the 
specific City Code section had been raised in the prior action, the second action was not barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata because the subject of the controversy in the prior action was not ripe for 
adjudication where the City had not yet attempted to enforce that section of the City Code); see also 
Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754,663 P.2d 287,290 (1983)(finding that "because 
facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that triggered the filing of the second suit," the issue was 
not ripe for trial in the first case); and, Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257-59,668 P.2d 130, 133-35 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that one of the limits of res judicata recognized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court is ·'where matters raised in the second litigation were not ripe for adjudication in the 
prior action."). 
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Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, cited often with approval by this Court,5 
recognizes ripeness as an exception to the doctrines of res judicata collateral estoppel. 
Specifically, Section 20(2) of the Restatement provides the following guidance in this regard: 
(2) A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on 
the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiffs failure to satisfY a 
precondition to the suit, does not bar another action by the plaintiff 
instituted after the claim has matured or the precondition has been 
satisfied, unless a second action is precluded by operation of the 
substantive law. 
Restatement (Second) ofJudgements § 20, Judgments for Defendant-~ Exception to the General Rule 
of Bar, at (2) (emphasis added). 
It is clear from the above language that the drafters of the Restatement understood that where 
a claim in the first action was premature. a second action is not barred after the claim has matured 
simply because the first action had been brought. This Court should recognize that Quail-Preston's 
arguments in this case are directly contrary to this law because they ignore the obvious fact that the 
amount due was not determined yet when the breach of contract claim was dismissed and, therefore, 
that such claim was not ripe for determination. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of res 
judicata simply does not apply once the claim becomes ripe for a determination. 
5 See, e.g. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990) (recognizing 
that Restatement (Second) of Judgments had been cited to and reviewed often by the Idaho Supreme 
Court over the years); see also Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 649 P .2d 
1197 ( 1 982) (citing with approval to Comment a to section 61 ); and, Shield v "lvforton Chemical Co., 95 
Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (adopting comment k to Section 402A). 
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That drafters of the Restatement understood this reality is best illustrated in the comments 
to this Section. Specifically, Illustration 5 to Section 20 gives the following particularly insightful 
example of what the commentators were contemplating when they drafted the above exception: 
Illustration: 
5. On January 1, 1972, A sues B alleging that in consideration of payment of 
S 100 by A, B agreed to deliver certain goods to A, and that B has failed to 
deliver the goods. At the trial it appears that the goods were to be delivered 
on June 1, 1972. The court directs verdict forB and judgment is given on the 
verdict for B. A is not precluded from maintaining an action for breach ofthe 
contract after June 1. 1982. if B has failed to deliver the goods on or before 
that day. 
!d., at Illustration 5 (emphasis added). This Court should note that the district court in this 
illustration directed verdict in favor of the defendant because the evidence at trial demonstrated that 
the defendant had no obligation to act under those facts because delivery was not yet due. Yet, 
despite the fact that directed verdict had been given on the breach of contract claim in this 
illustration, the commentators still recognized in that example that the plaintiff is not barred from 
bringing a second action against that defendant for breach of contract should the defendant fail to 
deliver the goods on or before the contractual date had passed. Notably, there is nothing within this 
illustration that states that counsel for A, the plaintiff, was required to request in response to the 
motion for directed verdict for the court to bifurcate the trial in order to preserve the right to bring 
a breach of contract claim once the delivery date had passed without the subsequent delivery. 
Similarly in this case, directed verdict was given at trial once it was determined by Judge 
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Brown that Quail Ridge was under no contractual obligation to pay adjusted rents until after such 
rents had been determined by an arbitrator or a court of competent jurisdiction. There was no dispute 
that such had not occurred as of the time of trial. As such, like in the example above, the defendant 
was not required to act until the condition precedent had been satisfied. In this case, the condition 
precedent was a determination of the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period. 
Yet, just like in the commentator's illustration above, once that condition precedent had been 
satisfied, the defendant, Quail Ridge, was under an obligation to act promptly. Once the defendant 
failed to act promptly, the plaintiff, P:N1C, was entitled to bring its breach of contract claim because 
the claim had then become ripe for determination. As in Illustration 5 above, PMC is not barred 
from brining this second action once Quail Ridge failed to perform as required under the contract. 
The mere fact that PMC brought a premature breach of contract action in P1\I!C I is not a bar to the 
second action which has now become mature and ripe for determination by a court. 
The commentators to Section 20(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provide the 
rationale for this exception: 
A determination by the court that the plaintiff has no enforceable claim 
because the action is premature, or because he has failed to satisfy a 
precondition to suit, is not a determination that he may not have an 
enforceable claim thereafter, and does not preclude him from maintaining an 
action when the claim has become enforceable. 
!d., at Comment k. 
The fact that this rationale applies in the case at hand is best demonstrated by Judge Brown's 
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statements in his Order on Form of Judgment. Judge Brown made it clear that his reasoning for 
granting directed verdict on the breach of contract claim in P1WC I is because PMC's breach 
contract claim was not yet ripe for determination: 
However, had Plaintiff opposed Quail Ridge [sic] Motion for Directed 
Verdict on Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim, the Court would have been 
constrained to grant the motion because there was no evidence in the trial 
record to support a claim that Quail Ridge was in breach of contract. Rather, 
Quail Ridge had paid rent each month in the original amount of$9,562.50. 
As such, there was no evidence that Quail Ridge was in violation or 
had breached the terms ofthe Ground Lease Agreement. Similarly, the Court 
would have also concluded, had the Court been asked to make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on this issue, that Quail Ridge had not violated 
the Ground Lease Agreement in failing to cooperate in the rent adjustment 
provisions .... There has been no breach established to the Court as of the 
time of trial in this matter. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 273-77) (citations omitted). The fact that Judge Brown understood that this breach 
of contract claim would later be ripe after he declared the 2010 adjusted rents is demonstrated by his 
language found later in his Order on Form of Judgment: 
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party 
indebted shalL promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the 
period affected by the adjustment." Now that the determination has been 
made as contemplated under the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground Lease 
Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the balance due under the Ground 
Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease Agreement does not define 
the term prompt for purposes of the parties· agreement, a failure to pay this 
amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach 
of contract. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 273-77) {citations omitted) {emphasis added) . 
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facts outlined Judge Brown in his Order on Form of Judgment demonstrate that the 
present case is no different than the commentators' Illustration No.5. This is simply a case where 
PMC's breach of contract claim in P1UC I was not yet mature or where there was a failure of a 
condition precedent before the suit could be brought. Directed verdict in favor of the defendant, 
Quail Ridge, under these circumstances was not fatal to PMC' s ability to bring a second action after 
the claim had become mature or after the condition precedent (i.e., Judge Brown's declaration ofthe 
2010 adjusted rents) had been satisfied. 
That Judge Naftz understood in the second action that the claim had now become mature or 
ripe for determination is demonstrated by his findings after hearing on the cross-motion for summary 
judgment: 
The Court's decision in this matter is to grant PMC Summary 
Judgment because of the because there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that the Court can find. By failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent from the 
2010 rent adjustment period determined by Judge Brown, Quail Ridge 
breached its obligations under the ground lease agreement. 
Further, summary judgment from PMC is appropriate against Forest 
Preston because there is no genuine issue of material fact that by failing to 
pay Quail Ridge's outstanding obligations under the ground lease, Mr. 
Preston is in breach of his obligation as a personal guarantee. 
It is clear to me the action is ripe for summary judgment, and I am 
going to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. I'm going to deny 
the cross motion for summary judgment, obviously, because of my ruling 
here today. 
(T r Hr' g on October 21, 2013, pp. 46:6- 4 7 :6) (emphasis added). The above-language demonstrates 
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Judge Naftz recognized that an action that was not ripe in the prior action before Judge Brown 
was now "ripe for summary judgment. There was no genuine issue of material on the of 
the breach of contract. As such, Judge Naftz granted summary judgment. His refusal to apply the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel under these circumstances was both consistent with 
Idaho case law as well as consistent with Section 20(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 
This case falls within one of the clear exceptions to the bar that otherwise would have applied. As 
such, Judge Naftz's rulings and judgment should be affirmed on this appeal. 
D. Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment in P1l1C I and Quail-Preston's failure to 
promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents in a reasonable time thereafter created a 
change in circumstances which has also been recognized by Idaho and the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments as an exception to the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. 
While the section supra demonstrates that ripeness is a long recognized exception to the bar 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, it is not the only exception that has been recognized by the 
Idaho Supreme Court or by the Restatement (Second) of Judgements. In Duthie v. Levt·iston Gun 
Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine 
of res judicata does not bar an action where '·facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that triggered 
the filing of the second suit."6 The Idaho Supreme Court's recognition in Duthie that a change in 
6 Although Quail-Preston argue that the Duthie Court's opinion is "bad law" and, therefore, 
requests this Court to take this opportunity to overturn it, Quail-Preston is misguided. As is discussed in 
detail in the arguments in Section C of Respondent Brief infra, the law recognized by the Court in Duthie 
is consistent with the law in this area as outlined in Restatement (Second) of Judgments. This 
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be an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and coilateral estoppel is 
consistent the law in this area as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 
Specifically, Comment f of Section 24 provides the following guidance of what effect a change of 
circumstances may have on the bringing of a new action after a failed prior action: 
f. Change of Circumstances. Material operative facts occurring after the 
decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in 
themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a 
transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by 
the ilrst. 
Restatement has long been recognized by Idaho courts as sound on this area of the law. See Diamond, 
119 Idaho at 150,804 P.2d at 323 (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Judgments had been cited to 
and reviewed often by the Idaho Supreme Court over the years). 
While it is true that Justice Bistline offered a spirited dissent in that case, this Court will 
recognize that Justice Bristline's dissent is not so much an attack on the statement of the law by the 
majority with regard to recognized exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata as it is an attack on the 
application of those exceptions to the facts of that case. Indeed, Justice Bristline was not amused by the 
Defendant-Respondent's ·'self help'· in that case which he found was exactly what it had been prohibited 
from doing in the first action. A comparison of those facts to the facts in the case at hand clearly 
demonstrates that no such concerns exist in this case. Indeed, this case cannot be more opposite in many 
respects. Rather that doing what it had been prohibited from doing in the prior action, in this case PMC 
did exactly what the prior district court indicated it should do in the event that Quail Ridge failed to pay 
the 2010 adjusted rents; bring a breach of contract action. It is not PMC's wrongdoing that has led to the 
present action but rather the wrongdoing of Quail-Preston. Thus, this Court should simply find that 
Justice Bristline's dissent is inappostie to the issues before this Court and, therefore is not persuasive nor 
helpful to the facts before the Court. 
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tut•c:rne:nt (Second) of Judgments § Dimensions Purposes ojlvferger or Bar 
General Rule Concerning "Splitting,·· at Comment f. 
In this case, this Court should recognize that Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment and 
Quail-Preston's subsequent failure to pay the 2010 adjusted rents declared by Judge Brown as then 
due and owing comprised a new and separate transaction distinct from the breach of contract claim 
raised by PMC in the PlvfC I action. This Court should further recognize that these new set of facts 
gave rise to a new and independent breach of contract claim against these defendants. 
Such a finding by this Court would certainly be consistent with Judge Brown's statements 
in his Order on Form of Judgment, which have already been cited in the section supra. There can 
be no doubt from his language in the Order on Form of Judgment that Judge Brown himself 
understood his Declaratory Judgment created a new set of facts that were separate and distinct from 
those presented to him at trial. There similarly can be no doubt that Judge Brown understood that 
this new fact created a new obligation for Quail Ridge to perform under the terms of the parties· 
Lease Agreement. Because Quail Ridge was obligated to perform, it also stands to reason that 
Preston was required to perform under the terms ofhis Guarantee. Finally, Judge Brown made it 
clear in his Order on Form of Judgment that should Quail Ridge fail in its obligation to promptly pay 
the 2010 adjusted rents declared by him- and by extension, Preston fail to perform under the terms 
of the Guarantee then a breach of contract action would follow. 
Judge Brown pointed this out to Quail Ridge even though he had previously granted Quail 
Ridge its motion for directed verdict on PMC's prior breach of contract claim. Why would he do 
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so? It is reasonable to believe that Judge Brown understood that a new set of facts was now in place 
that give rise to a new breach of contract claim and he was pointing this out to Quail Ridge 
in hopes ofthis second action being avoided. Quail-Preston did not give heed to Judge Brown's plan 
for how the case would proceed should they fail to pay and this new breach of contract action was 
brought by PMC against them for their failure to pay the 2010 adjusted rents declared by Judge 
Brown. 
The fact that Judge Naftz recognized Judge Brown's declaratory judgment and Quail-
Preston's failure to pay as a new transaction giving rise to a new breach of contract claim is 
illustrated in his findings at the conclusion of argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment: 
I think it's pretty clear that this is an action on breach of contract case. 
Judge Brown issued his decision. A new set of facts arose, and based on that, 
a breach of contract action was filed. 
(Tr Hr'g on October 21,2013, pp. 46:6-10) (emphasis added). Because he recognized that he was 
dealing with a change of circumstances from PAtfC I, this Court should affirm Judge Naftz's refusal 
to apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel under these circumstances. This Court 
should find that Judge Naftz' s ruling was consistent with the law previously outlined by this Court 
in Duthie as well as the iaw outlined in Comment f of Section 24, Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments. Because the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel did not apply to these 
changed circumstances, this Court should uphold Judge Naftz's grant of summary judgment. There 
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ts no issue of material fact this case that Quail Ridge and Preston failed to pay the 2010 
adjusted rents declared by Judge Brmvn as currently due and For these reasons, this Court 
should affirm Judge Naftz's decision to grant summary judgment in PMC's favor and his decision 
to deny Quail-Preston's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
E. This court should adopt Section 26(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments and find that where a prior court has expressly reserved the right 
of a plaintiff in a first action to pursue a second action, then the second action 
is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
Although the prior two Sections of Respondent Brief each provide this Court with a separate 
and independent basis to affirm Judge Naftz's refusal to apply the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel to the facts of this case, this Court should take this opportunity to adopf Section 
26( 1 )(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and find that where a prior court has expressly 
reserved to a plaintiff the right to pursue a second action, then the second action is not barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
Quail-Preston maintains in this appeal that PMC was required to bifurcate the earlier trial and 
that it should not be allowed to bring a new action. That Judge Brown, who presided over the trial 
in P1vfC I, did not agree with this assessment is demonstrated by his Order on Form of Judgment: 
7 See Diamond, 119 Idaho at 150, 804 P.2d at 322 (finding that ·'rather than categorically 
adopting an entire chapter of the Restatement, this Court has consistently displayed its preference for 
selectively examining various sections and comments from the Restatement, and thereafter adopting, 
citing favorably, or rejecting the provision, as the occasion warrants). In this case, this Court should find 
that this is an appropriate occasion to adopt this limited section of the Restatement. 
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The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party 
indebted shalL promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the 
period affected by the adjustment." Now that the determination has been 
made as contemplated under the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground Lease 
Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the balance due under the Ground 
Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease Agreement does not define 
the term prompt for purposes of the parties' agreement, a failure to pay this 
amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach 
of contract. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 273-77) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By stating in this last and final Order 
that Quail Ridge's failure to pay the 2010 adjusted rents in a reasonable time would give rise to an 
action for breach of contract, Judge Brown expressly reserved to PMC the right to pursue a new 
claim for breach of contract should Quail Ridge fail to perform under the contract as outlined by him. 
Section 26 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, addresses this issue and provides a 
list of exceptions for when splitting trials is permissible, although such is generally unfavored under 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel: 
(1) When any of the following circumstances exist, the general rule of§ 24 
does not apply to extinguish the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as 
a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant: 
* * * * 
* * * * 
(b) The court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiffs 
right to maintain the second action; 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 26, Exceptions to the General Rule Concerning Splitting, at 
(l)(b). 
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Because Judge expressly reserved to PMC the right to pursue a breach contract 
to the l 0 adjusted rents within a reasonable time, the present 
case is not extinguished by the directed verdict granted by Judge Brown in the first action. 
Furthermore, this Court should find that PMC was simply doing what it was directed by the Plv!C 
I court to do the event that Quail Ridge failed to perform under the terms of the parties' Ground 
Lease once Judge Brown declared the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period. Finally, 
this Court should find that where Judge Brown expressly reserved to PMC the right to bring this 
second action for breach of contract should Quail Ridge fail to perform under the terms of the Lease 
Agreement, then the second action is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. Such a holding would be consistent with Section 26( 1 )(b) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, which should be adopted by this Court. ln so finding, this Court should affirm on appeal 
the judgment of the district court. 
F. Preston is a Proper Party to this Action. 
The district court did not err when it granted judgment against both Quail Ridge and Preston. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case that the Guarantee executed by Preston on June 
1, 2001, obligated him to pay the adjusted rents declared by Judge Brown when Quail Ridge failed 
to do so. Similarly, there is no genuine issue of material fact or question oflaw in this case that once 
Judge Brown determined the 2010 adjusted rents, Quail Ridge and Preston were both obligated to 
promptly pay such ad jus ted rents under the terms ofthe parties Lease Agreement and under the terms 
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Preston's Guarantee. 
legal reasons outlined Sections C, D, and E supra of the Respondent Brief, the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar PMC from bringing this present action 
against not only Quail Ridge but also against Preston. Because the present action was not 
extinguished by the prior action, PMC was within its rights to sue Preston for his failure to perform 
under the terms of his Guarantee once Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents. 
The district court correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact in this 
case and that judgment in favor of PMC and against both Quail Ridge and Preston was appropriate 
as a matter oflaw. Because the district court did not err in granting such summary judgment, the 
district court should be aft1rmed by this Court on appeal. 
G. The District Court Did not Err in Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs to PM C. 
In Idaho lvfilitary Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, No. 39909, 2014 WL 2735320 (Boise, 
December 2013 Term), this Court articulated the following standard of review relevant to the grant 
of attorneys fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l): 
"A trial court's determination of whether a party prevailed is a matter of 
discretion." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,434-45, 111 P.3d 110, 
119-20 (2005). An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and 
l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See 
Saveage v. Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,250, 
869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). The district court's determination as to whether 
an action was brought or defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P .2d 
923,925 (1981). 
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Soc Inc. v. Maslen, No. 39909, 2014 WL 2735320, at *3 (Boise, 
December 2013 Term). 
This Court further found that when an exercise of discretion is involved, "this Court conducts 
a three-step inquiry: ( l) whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached is decision by the 
exercise of reason." !d. 
In the case at hand, application of the above standards sides in favor with the district court. 
First, a review ofthe Judge Naftz' s Order Regarding Attorney Fees reveals that he clearly understood 
and perceived that the issue of attorney fees was one of discretion. Indeed, in the opening line ofhis 
analysis, Judge Naftz states: "Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) provides 
a court with the discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party when authorized 
by statute or contract." (R Vo. I, pp. 413-414) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no doubt in this 
case that Judge Naftz properly perceived that this issue was a matter of discretion. 
Next, there is ample evidence in this case that Judge Naftz acted within the outer boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the choices before him. 
Again, a review ofhis Order Regarding Attorney Fees demonstrates that Judge Naftz considered the 
applicable rules and legal standards that were to guide his decision. For instance, in analyzing a 
grant of attorneys fees under § 12-121, Judge Naftz found: 
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\\M.~v,·r even in cases where ''the losing party has asserted factual or legal 
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation", as long as 
"there is a legitimate, triable issue offact or a legitimate issue attorney 
fees may not be awarded" under IC § 12-121. 
(R Vo. 1, pp. 414-415)(citingA1cGrewv. JvfcGrew, 139 Idaho 551-562, 82 P.3d 833, 8844 (2003)). 
Judge Naftz further recognized that ·'attorney fees may not be awarded under IC § 12-121 unless the 
losing party's entire case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." (R Vo. 1, pp. 413-414) 
(citing Vendelin v. Costco Wholelvale, Corp., 140 Idaho 416,434, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2007)). These 
citations as well as the other authority cited by Judge Naftz in his Order Regarding Attorney Fees 
demonstrate that he correctly perceived and acted within the outer boundaries his discretion and 
further acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before him. 
Quail-Preston next contend that Judge Naftz's failure to cite to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is somehow 
fatal and is evidence of the fact that he did not consider these factors in determining whether PMC' s 
requested attorney fees were reasonable. Such argument, however, is simply misguided. 
stated: 
With regard to a trial court's analysis of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, this Court has previously 
Though it is not necessary for the court to address all of the LR. C.P. 54( e )(3) 
factors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of 
the factors. However, the bottom line in an award of attornev's fees is 
reasonableness. 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,433, 196 P.3d 341, 351 (2008) (citations omitted). In this 
case, although Judge Naftz did not place into writing his consideration of all the Rule 54(e)(3) 
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factors, ncr1TT"'" decision does evidence that all such factors were considered. In Order on 
Attorney Fees, Judge Naftz stated: 
Having thoroughly reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees and 
supporting memorandum and affidavit, as well as taking into careful consideration the 
Defendant's objections and the oral arguments presented at the hearing, this Court hereby 
awards the Plaintiff the sum of $15,599.75 in attorney fees. This Court reduced the 
Plaintiffs request for fees by S 197.25. 
(R Vol. 1, p. 416). Specifically, a review of the briefing on this motion and the hearing minutes in 
this issue demonstrates that Quail-Preston's main challenge to the reasonableness ofPMC's request 
for attorney fees was certain entries being claimed by PMC. (R Vol. 1, pp. 405-409) (Tr Hr' g on 
December 16, 2013, at 11 :22 - 14:21 ). The above-cited language demonstrates that Judge Naftz 
specifically took the disputed entries into consideration and adjusted PMC 's claim for attorney fees 
accordingly. 
Given the totality of this record evidence, there can be no doubt that Judge Naftz exercised 
reason in exercising his discretion to award attorney fees in this case. He further exercises reason 
in determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees to award. In fact, Judge Naftz even adjusted 
PMC's attorney fees based upon issues raised by Quail-Preston's attorneys. Thus, the amount of 
attorney fees awarded in this case was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case. 
With regard to the district court's award of discretionary costs to PMC, the same three-step 
inquiry as above-outlined is required: "( 1) whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
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consistently with 
reached is decision the 
at *3. 
applicable to specific 
,. Idaho 
(3) whether the court 
14 2735320, 
In this case, Judge Naftz's Order Regarding Attorney Fees demonstrates that Judge Naftz 
understood and perceived that the issue of costs was also one of discretion for him. Furthermore, 
a review ofhis decision demonstrates that Judge Naftz understood the boundaries of such discretion 
as guided by the legal standards applicable to the specific choice before him. Indeed, in this regard, 
Judge Naftz noted that, while the awarding of such costs is discretionary, "'the burden is on the 
prevailing party to make an adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary and exceptional 
and reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." 
(R Vol. 1, p. 418)( citing Wesifall v. Catepillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918,926,821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991)). 
Judge Naftz further found that, under Rule 54(d)(l)(D), he was required to make •·express findings 
as to why each discretionary costs item should or should not be allowed:' (R Vol. 1, p. 418). These 
citations as well as the other citations contained within the court's Order Regarding Attorney Fees 
demonstrates that Judge Naftz acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently 
with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices before him. 
As to whether his decision was reached by the exercise of reason, Judge Naftz states within 
his Order on Attorney Fees: 
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Plaintiffs memorandum and considering the arguments 
opposition presented by the Defendant, Court has determined the 
costs this matter were a necessary and reasonable 
part ofthis case. This Court has also determined these were exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred. 
(R Vol. 1, p. 419). The above language demonstrates that Judge Naftz exercised reason in reaching 
his decision to award and grant PMC these exceptional costs. This language also shows that Judge 
Naftz considered all arguments on the issue prior to reaching a decision. It is clear from this 
language that Judge Naftz certainly understood that he had discretion to act in this circumstance and 
he did not act until he had fairly and fully considered all arguments for and against the awarding of 
these exceptional costs. After considering these arguments, Judge Naftz recognized that he had 
discretion to grant these research costs and determined that such costs "were a necessary and 
reasonable part of this case" that were '·exceptional costs reasonably incurred." 
Judge Naftz was well within his discretion in this case to award costs and attorney fees to 
8 Which was the same arguments and case law that Quail-Preston raise in this appeal. Namely 
citing to one Federal bankruptcy court case for the proposition that legal research is a routine cost that 
are part of the overhead of running a law firm. This argument, however, fails to recognize the reality that 
it is not an uncommon practice for smaller law firms in rural communities, like Pocatello, Idaho, to pass 
part of this costs onto their clients. This is what happened in this case. Indeed, the records in this case 
demonstrate that Judge Brown was aware that this expense was passed on to and paid by PMC long prior 
to PMC's motion for costs and attorney fees. (Tr Hr'g on December 16,2013, pp. 14:22- 16:22) (R Vol. 
1, pp. 346-52). Frankly, if Quail-Preston had simply posted the bond necessary to secure the stay 
previously granted by the district court, these legal research expenses could have possibly been avoided 
because the matter would have been stayed pending this Court's decision in PJ;[C I. 
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PMC as the 
appeal absent 
His use of discretion to do so should not be 
of such discretion. Quail-Preston 
Court on 
not presented 
any evidence of an abuse of discretion by the district court in this case and, therefore, Judge N aftz' s 
award of these costs and attorneys fees should be affirmed by this Court on appeal. 
Furthermore, this Court should recognize that Judge Naftz did not award attorneys fees on 
the basis ofLC. § 12-121 alone. Rather, Judge Naftz's Order makes it clear that P:Y1C was entitled 
to attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party pursuant to Section 10.3 of the parties' Lease 
Agreement. Notably, Quail-Preston has not challenged this legal basis for Judge Naftz's award of 
attorneys fees in this case and, therefore, they have waived this argument now on appeal. See lvfyers 
v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004) (finding that '''this Court 
will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief."') (citing State v. 
Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995)). Similarly, Quail-Preston has not 
challenged the district court's award of costs that were a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54( d)( I )(C). Thus, even if this Court were to determine that attorney fees and costs as a matter of 
right should not have been granted under I.C. 12-121, this Court should find that the court's error 
is not reversible because the Court appropriately awarded such costs and fees under the parties' 
contract. l.R. C. P. 54( e )(1) provided the court with the necessary discretion to award attorney fees 
to PMC as the prevailing party when so authorized by contract. Similarly, LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c) 
provided the court with discretion to award costs to PMC as the prevailing party under these same 
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this should find that any error claimed Quail-Preston with regard 
to mandatory costs and attorney is not reversible error therefore, affirm courts 
award of mandatory costs and attorney fees on appeal. This Court should further find that the district 
court had discretion to grant discretionary costs under the facts of this case and that it did not abuse 
its discretion in so doing. As such, this Court should affirm Judge Nafta's full grant of costs and 
attorney fees in this case and affirm the district court's decision in this regard. 
H. P::\'iC is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
If the court affirms the district court on appeal, then PMC will be the prevailing party on 
appeal. The entire case will then be disposed of and there will be nothing left to litigate on remand. 
PMC wilL therefore, be the overall prevailing party in a claim involving a commercial transaction. 
PMC will further have prevailed on an appeal involving a contract with an attorney fees and costs 
provision. Therefore, this Court should award PMC attorney fees and costs associated with 
responding to this appeal. 
Idaho Code Section 120(3) provides for attorney fees for the prevailing party in a 
commercial transaction. Idaho Code § 1 120(3 ). Section 12-120(3) is clear in its definition of a 
commercial transaction: " ... all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes." ld. This suit concerns a commercial lease agreement and has nothing to do with 
personal or household purposes. Attorney fees must be awarded in this case pursuant to 12-120(3) 
because this case involves a commercial lease. See, e.g. Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 986 P.2d 
Respondent Brief Page 36 
101 133 Idaho 353 (1999) farmer who prevailed in breach contract action against 
landlord was entitled to fees pursuant to I.C. 12-120(3)); and, V. 
Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 900 P.2d 201 (1995) (lease dispute concerning operation of cattle ranch 
upon which neither party maintained a home was "commercial transaction" under I. C. § 12-120(3)). 
If the district court is affirmed on appeal, this Court should find that PMC is the overall prevailing 
party in a commercial transaction and, therefore, is entitled to an award of attorneys fees pursuant 
to I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Additionally, this Court should recognize that the parties' Lease Agreement provides that the 
prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees: 
10.3 Attorney's Fees. In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful 
detainer of the said premises, for the recoverv of any rent due under the 
provisions of this lease, or breach of a covenant herein contained to be kept 
or performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasonable attorney's fee by 
the other party, and such attorney's fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the 
commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action 
is prosecuted to judgment. 
(R Vol. 1, p. 385). There can be no doubt that PMC should be awarded attorney fees pursuant to this 
section of the Lease Agreement if the district court is affirmed on appeal because this breach of 
contract action is for the recovery of rent due under the provision of this Lease Agreement. As such, 
this Court should award PMC its costs and attorney fees associated with this appeal if the Court 
affirms the decision of the district court in granting summary judgment in favor of this Plaintiff. 
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Because PMC, as has asserted this claim as an issue presented on appeal 
pursuant to 35(b)(5) 4l(a), fees for this 
appeal as the prevailing party. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, PMC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
decisions of the district court and affirm the Amended Final Judgment entered by the district court. 
This Court should find that the district court did not err by refusing to apply the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel to the facts of this case because: ( 1) PMC' s current breach of contract 
claim is not barred by these doctrines because it was not ripe in Pit1C I and did not become ripe until 
after Judge Brown entered his Declaratory Judgment in that action and Quail Ridge and Preston 
thereafter failed to promptly pay the rents so adjusted; {2) Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment in 
Pi\rfC J and Quail Ridge and Preston's failure to promptly pay thereafter created a change in 
circumstances and a new set of facts which is a recognized exception to these doctrines; or, {3) Judge 
Brown expressly reserved to PMC in the first action the right to pursue the second action should 
Quail Ridge fail to promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents. This Court should adopt Section 26(1 )(b) 
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and find that where a prior court has expressly reserved 
the right of a plaintiff in a first action to pursue a second action, then the second action is not barred 
by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
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This Court should also affirm the district court's grant of fees should award 
and reasonable attorneys fees and costs on appeal as the overall prevailing party to 
action as set forth in Section IILG supra. 
DATED this of June, 2014. 
MERRILL & MERRILL CHARTERED 
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